Does a Text, Any Text, Need an Authoritative Interpreter to Make Real the Moral Obligation to Interpret It Correctly?
Dave Armstrong has challenged Wildboar with the common assertion that sola scriptura cannot be valid, since it does not have an authoritative court to decide which interpretations of Scripture work.To the possibility that Scripture might be read to prove a Church Father wrong he asks:
1) Who determines whether the Fathers (generally or individually) are "biblical" and "right or wrong" based on a comparison with the Bible?
2) On what grounds does this standard have more authority than the Fathers whom it / his / her deems "non-biblical? So, for instance, if Chemnitz says that Augustine or Chrysostom or Ambrose or Irenaeus are "unbiblical" concerning thus-and-such, why should I accept his opinion over against that of these eminent Fathers whom he is critiquing?
3) Now, if you say that this is determined by a vote of Lutheran scholars or pastors or something (I don't know what your answer would be; I'm just being hypothetical here), then how is that all that different from what Catholics do (i.e., applying some authority besides Scripture itself to authoritatively interpret Scripture, and correct or confirm expositors of it?
4) How is that (the scenario in #3)still somehow sola Scriptura, while Catholic dogmatic pronouncements are not? What's the practical difference (apart from Catholic considerations and claims of infallibility, where applicable, which is a clear difference)?
5) And how is accepting some Lutheran denominational pronouncement on which patristic statements are biblical and which are not, more intrinsically authoritative that (again) what occurs in the Catholic Church? As readers can by now surmise, my position is that sola Scriptura inevitably breaks down as internally incoherent and inconsistent. The bottom-line question (when looked at with sufficient scrutiny) really becomes: on what grounds do we accept one exegetical / hermeneutical / dogmatic authority over another? Why choose Lutheran (or Reformed) interpretations over that of the fathers, or of Catholicism or Orthodoxy?
Here’s my problem with this, and it is one I have stated before: the underlying assumption here is that Scripture as a written document cannot ultimately speak clearly enough to make us guilty from transgressing it without a human court of authority to enforce its statements with correct interpretation. (Note, frequently the argument is rendered with the phrase in bold as "settle disputes," which is an obvious and trivial truism. Obviously a book by itself cannot stop me from misinterpreting itself. But it can, I contend, be sufficiently clear for me to be guilty before God for misinterpreting it. So the issue between us is: Am I morally obligated to follow the Scriptures as I understand them, even when an authoritative church body interprets them differently? I say yes, Armstrong says no. I certainly accept however that I am also morally obligated to test my understanding against those of all other Christians, and especially those of distinguished reputation and holiness, and not to disagree with them without such testing.)
I contend that that underlying assumption carries with it dangerous skepticism about the power of language. I know Dave Armstrong is not himself a skeptic, but I think that is the implication of his position. Let’s us an analogy. I believe Roe vs. Wade is bad constitutional law. Quite apart from the issue of abortion itself, I believe it has no legitimate basis in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Let’s say I cite people who agree with me, like Stephen Carter. Now, what if someone were to say: the Supreme Court has said you are wrong, therefore as an honest man you are in conscience bound to accept that the Fourteenth Amendment doesn't say what you think it does. Amend the Fourteenth Amendment if you like, but recognize that the Constitution, like any text, needs a living authority to interpret it before it can be a legal norm at all. The Supreme Court is that living authority, and that living authority disagrees with you.
Couldn’t that person use exactly Dave Armstrong’s arguments?
1) Who determines whether the judicial precedents are "constitutional" and "legitimate" based on a comparison with the Constitution?
2) On what grounds does this standard have more authority than the preceding legal decisions whom it / his / her deems "unconstitutional"? So, for instance, if Carter says that the views of Thurgood Marshall or Harry Blackmun or Lawrence Tribe are "unconstitutional" concerning Roe vs. Wade, why should I accept his opinion over against that of these eminent jurists whom he is critiquing?
3) Now, if you say that this is determined by a vote of pro-life/originalist scholars or jurists or something (I don't know what your answer would be; I'm just being hypothetical here), then how is that all that different from what Roe vs. Wade supporters do (i.e., applying some authority besides the Constitution itself – i.e. the Supreme Court – to authoritatively interpret the Constitution, and correct or confirm expositors of it?)
4) How is that (the scenario in #3) still somehow just following the Constitution, while Supreme Court dogmatic pronouncements are not? What's the practical difference (apart from the Supreme Court’s position as the arbiter of the law of the land, which is a clear difference)?
5) And how is accepting some pro-life or originalist position on which constitutional statements are legitimate and which are not, more intrinsically authoritative that (again) what occurs in the Supreme Court?As readers can by now surmise, my position is that allowing individuals like Stephen Carter to have opinions on constitutional law contrary to existing Supreme Court precedents inevitably breaks down as internally incoherent and inconsistent. The bottom-line question (when looked at with sufficient scrutiny) really becomes: on what grounds do we accept one legal / hermeneutical / juristic authority over another? Why choose Carter’s interpretations over that of the 1970s jurists, or of the Supreme Court today?
Throw in reminders that I’m no constutional scholar and that it would be arrogant for me to assume that I know better than all those learned justices and the argument is complete: an individual who wants to be intellectually honest is morally obligated to defer to the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of the constitution. Any denial of that body's definite decisions is intellectually incoherent and inconsistent.
In fact, I've heard this argument many times specifically drawn vis a vis Roe vs. Wade and to me, it has always seemed absurd. Quite apart from whether the Supreme Court is or is not infallible, the idea that the existence of dispute over interpretation of a text whose authority they accept means that someone does not have a moral obligation to follow their conscience in interpretation seems wrong on the face of it. Which means Dave Armstrong’s argument too must be wrong.
If Armstrong’s argument makes sense for the particular text known as the Bible, why doesn’t it work for the particular text known as the Constitution? Armstrong’s argument makes no reference to the Bible’s nature as a religious text, so that can’t be the issue. He appears to be arguing for a living authority not because the Catholic Church has claimed to be that authority, but because such an authority is needed by the nature of Bible as a mere text, one which in practice has been interpreted differently by different people. And if that's the case, then his argument applies to all texts. Which is obviously not held by anyone, hence Dave Armstrong's argument is wrong.
Originally posted at Here We Stand.
UPDATE: As it turns out Dave Armstrong was not making this strong, hermeneutic argument, but rather the practical, "As it turns the Protestants just can't agree on what Scripture means so there must be a final authority to make unity practical." I have big problems with that too (basically the obvious one that the Papacy has not secured unity of all acknowledged Trinitarian Christians either), but it's a different point. Since however the argument I'm arguing against is pretty widespread I'll leave this post up here as a witness against it.
1) Who determines whether the Fathers (generally or individually) are "biblical" and "right or wrong" based on a comparison with the Bible?
2) On what grounds does this standard have more authority than the Fathers whom it / his / her deems "non-biblical? So, for instance, if Chemnitz says that Augustine or Chrysostom or Ambrose or Irenaeus are "unbiblical" concerning thus-and-such, why should I accept his opinion over against that of these eminent Fathers whom he is critiquing?
3) Now, if you say that this is determined by a vote of Lutheran scholars or pastors or something (I don't know what your answer would be; I'm just being hypothetical here), then how is that all that different from what Catholics do (i.e., applying some authority besides Scripture itself to authoritatively interpret Scripture, and correct or confirm expositors of it?
4) How is that (the scenario in #3)still somehow sola Scriptura, while Catholic dogmatic pronouncements are not? What's the practical difference (apart from Catholic considerations and claims of infallibility, where applicable, which is a clear difference)?
5) And how is accepting some Lutheran denominational pronouncement on which patristic statements are biblical and which are not, more intrinsically authoritative that (again) what occurs in the Catholic Church? As readers can by now surmise, my position is that sola Scriptura inevitably breaks down as internally incoherent and inconsistent. The bottom-line question (when looked at with sufficient scrutiny) really becomes: on what grounds do we accept one exegetical / hermeneutical / dogmatic authority over another? Why choose Lutheran (or Reformed) interpretations over that of the fathers, or of Catholicism or Orthodoxy?
Here’s my problem with this, and it is one I have stated before: the underlying assumption here is that Scripture as a written document cannot ultimately speak clearly enough to make us guilty from transgressing it without a human court of authority to enforce its statements with correct interpretation. (Note, frequently the argument is rendered with the phrase in bold as "settle disputes," which is an obvious and trivial truism. Obviously a book by itself cannot stop me from misinterpreting itself. But it can, I contend, be sufficiently clear for me to be guilty before God for misinterpreting it. So the issue between us is: Am I morally obligated to follow the Scriptures as I understand them, even when an authoritative church body interprets them differently? I say yes, Armstrong says no. I certainly accept however that I am also morally obligated to test my understanding against those of all other Christians, and especially those of distinguished reputation and holiness, and not to disagree with them without such testing.)
I contend that that underlying assumption carries with it dangerous skepticism about the power of language. I know Dave Armstrong is not himself a skeptic, but I think that is the implication of his position. Let’s us an analogy. I believe Roe vs. Wade is bad constitutional law. Quite apart from the issue of abortion itself, I believe it has no legitimate basis in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Let’s say I cite people who agree with me, like Stephen Carter. Now, what if someone were to say: the Supreme Court has said you are wrong, therefore as an honest man you are in conscience bound to accept that the Fourteenth Amendment doesn't say what you think it does. Amend the Fourteenth Amendment if you like, but recognize that the Constitution, like any text, needs a living authority to interpret it before it can be a legal norm at all. The Supreme Court is that living authority, and that living authority disagrees with you.
Couldn’t that person use exactly Dave Armstrong’s arguments?
1) Who determines whether the judicial precedents are "constitutional" and "legitimate" based on a comparison with the Constitution?
2) On what grounds does this standard have more authority than the preceding legal decisions whom it / his / her deems "unconstitutional"? So, for instance, if Carter says that the views of Thurgood Marshall or Harry Blackmun or Lawrence Tribe are "unconstitutional" concerning Roe vs. Wade, why should I accept his opinion over against that of these eminent jurists whom he is critiquing?
3) Now, if you say that this is determined by a vote of pro-life/originalist scholars or jurists or something (I don't know what your answer would be; I'm just being hypothetical here), then how is that all that different from what Roe vs. Wade supporters do (i.e., applying some authority besides the Constitution itself – i.e. the Supreme Court – to authoritatively interpret the Constitution, and correct or confirm expositors of it?)
4) How is that (the scenario in #3) still somehow just following the Constitution, while Supreme Court dogmatic pronouncements are not? What's the practical difference (apart from the Supreme Court’s position as the arbiter of the law of the land, which is a clear difference)?
5) And how is accepting some pro-life or originalist position on which constitutional statements are legitimate and which are not, more intrinsically authoritative that (again) what occurs in the Supreme Court?As readers can by now surmise, my position is that allowing individuals like Stephen Carter to have opinions on constitutional law contrary to existing Supreme Court precedents inevitably breaks down as internally incoherent and inconsistent. The bottom-line question (when looked at with sufficient scrutiny) really becomes: on what grounds do we accept one legal / hermeneutical / juristic authority over another? Why choose Carter’s interpretations over that of the 1970s jurists, or of the Supreme Court today?
Throw in reminders that I’m no constutional scholar and that it would be arrogant for me to assume that I know better than all those learned justices and the argument is complete: an individual who wants to be intellectually honest is morally obligated to defer to the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of the constitution. Any denial of that body's definite decisions is intellectually incoherent and inconsistent.
In fact, I've heard this argument many times specifically drawn vis a vis Roe vs. Wade and to me, it has always seemed absurd. Quite apart from whether the Supreme Court is or is not infallible, the idea that the existence of dispute over interpretation of a text whose authority they accept means that someone does not have a moral obligation to follow their conscience in interpretation seems wrong on the face of it. Which means Dave Armstrong’s argument too must be wrong.
If Armstrong’s argument makes sense for the particular text known as the Bible, why doesn’t it work for the particular text known as the Constitution? Armstrong’s argument makes no reference to the Bible’s nature as a religious text, so that can’t be the issue. He appears to be arguing for a living authority not because the Catholic Church has claimed to be that authority, but because such an authority is needed by the nature of Bible as a mere text, one which in practice has been interpreted differently by different people. And if that's the case, then his argument applies to all texts. Which is obviously not held by anyone, hence Dave Armstrong's argument is wrong.
Originally posted at Here We Stand.
UPDATE: As it turns out Dave Armstrong was not making this strong, hermeneutic argument, but rather the practical, "As it turns the Protestants just can't agree on what Scripture means so there must be a final authority to make unity practical." I have big problems with that too (basically the obvious one that the Papacy has not secured unity of all acknowledged Trinitarian Christians either), but it's a different point. Since however the argument I'm arguing against is pretty widespread I'll leave this post up here as a witness against it.
posted by CPA at 1:52 PM
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